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When local public goods are provided by a centralized authority, spillovers are internalized,
but heterogeneity in preferences may be suppressed. Besley and Coate (2003) recently exa-
mined this classic trade-off for a uniform tax regime with strategic delegation. Here, we extend
their approach by allowing for a non-uniform tax regime. We ﬁnd that centralization with non-
uniform taxation unambiguously increases welfare in comparison to uniform-tax centralization.
With non-cooperative legislators coming from symmetric districts, our centralization dominates
decentralization for any degree of spillovers. In other cases, non-uniform taxation at least im-
proves the odds of centralization, if measured by a utilitarian yardstick.
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1. Introduction
Centralization involves a host of trade-offs. A centralized government exploits re-
turns to scale in public goods provision, but faces pronounced information asymmetry.
Spillovers can be efﬁciently resolved by centralization, but centralized taxation may be
more distortive. Also, centralization may induce higher total investment into wasteful
rent-seeking. The case for centralization of local public goods is predominantly driven
by cross-border spillovers, and is strengthened in the presence of economies of scale
in public good production (or in tax administration, cf. (Redoano and Scharff, 2004)).
However, centralization is not costless. As Oates (1972) argues, welfare loss arises
whenever jurisdictions vary in preferences, and the amount of a public good is bound
to be equal across jurisdictions. The loss magniﬁes with increasing price elasticity
of public good demand. Secondly, the issue of asymmetric information is of extreme
relevance here. For a central authority, reliable local information is costlier to obtain.
Voters observe lower yardstick competition at the central level and, hence, have fewer
opportunities to assess public sector performance.
Seabright (1996) builds a model capturing another important problem of centrali-
zation, namely lower accountability. Centralization may decrease the level of political
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competition, providing an additional source of political rents. Furthermore, the propo-
nents of the FOCJ concept (Functionally Overlapping Competing Jurisdiction), mainly
Frey (1996), observe slower policy innovation in a centralized system. On the other
hand, Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2001) construct a model with opposite results.
When interest groups in jurisdictions have common interests and lobbying fea-
tures economies of scale, centralization may also boost rent-seeking expenditures and
consequently distort market allocation (Bordignon et al., 2003; Bardhan, Mookherjee,
2000).
To tackle the beneﬁts and costs of centralization, we restrict attention to the classic
trade-off between spillovers and heterogeneity. We put aside other, albeit important,
issues of locational choice, accountability, and incomplete information. Our approach
draws from the seminal setup of Besley and Coate (2003), but we extend their approach
by introducing a non-uniform tax system. In other words, we study how centralization
performs when the beneﬁts (i.e. amounts of local public goods) as well as the costs are
non-uniform across districts.
Besley and Coate (2003) depart from the existing literature in emphasizing the po-
litical processes of decision-making. If governments under centralized systems were
allowedtoallocatedifferentlevelsoflocalpublicgoodstodifferentdistricts,theycould
respect the preferences of citizens in each district while optimally accounting for cross-
border spillovers. This would make the centralized system preferable. If there is a case
for a decentralized system, then it must follow from political economy considerations.
Centralization has been typically modeled as a system in which public spending is
ﬁnanced by general taxation and all jurisdictions receive a uniform level of local public
goods. In a decentralized system, local public goods are ﬁnanced by local taxation and
each district chooses its own preferred level. This approach has been adopted by Oates
(1972), who argued that the drawbacks of centralized and decentralized systems are
uniformity in provision and absence of reﬂecting the beneﬁts going to other regions,
respectively. This logic relies crucially on the assumption that centralization provides
uniform levels of public goods. Besley and Coate (2003) relax this assumption and
then study various forms of centralized decision-making.
We also relax the assumption of policy uniformity (i.e. uniform level of public
goods) stipulated in Oates (1972) and Musgrave (1959). To the best of our knowledge,
this assumption was only motivated by the implications of asymmetric information
incentives between central and local authorities.1
The main innovation of our approach is to let district-speciﬁc head tax depend on
the amount of public goods provided in each region. The reason is that for district-
uniform head tax, a marginal increase in public spending in one district increases
average tax across all districts equally. In our tax system, the increase is not equal,
but higher for the beneﬁciary district. This brings the private marginal cost of pub-
lic goods provision closer to the private marginal beneﬁt and improves the odds for
centralization compared to decentralization.
For a centralized legislature, we postulate either non-cooperative or cooperative
policy makers. We observe that cooperativeness as such cannot resolve conﬂicts in
preferences among the regions, since voters can insure against policy cooperative-
ness by strategic delegation. Strategic delegation has its origins in industrial economics
(Fershtman, Judd, 1987) and monetary policy (Rogoff, 1985), resulting in applications
1Cheikbossian (2000) argues that in a game played between a central policy-maker and decentralized au-
thorities, the latter have an incentive to report excessive expenditure needs and low tax-paying capacity. This
misinformation induces policy uniformity.
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to public economics (Persson, Tabellini, 1990). Like in Cheikbossian (2000), in our
framework a non-cooperative voter delegates a policy maker with a different concern
for local public goods than is his or her own.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the frame-
work for our analysis. Section 3 provides a brief review of the standard analysis. Sec-
tion 4 presents a political economy analysis with two forms of taxation beginning with
a centralized system, assuming minimum winning coalitions. Section 5 continues in
this direction, considering a more cooperative legislature. Finally, Section 6 offers con-
cluding remarks.
2. The Model
There are two geographically distinct regions or districts indexed by i ∈ {1,2},
each populated by a continuum of citizens with a mass of unity. The citizens are im-
mobile between the regions. The economy contains three goods: a single private good,
x, and two local public goods, g1 and g2, each one associated with a particular district.
Each citizen is endowed with some of the private good and throughout we will assume
that the endowments are high enough for each citizen to meet their required tax oblig-
ations. To produce one unit of either of the public goods requires (constant) p units of
the private good.
Each citizen in district i is characterized by a public goods preference parameter
l, to be interpreted as the interest in public goods of both districts. The preferences of
a type l citizen in district i are
x+l[(1−k)lngi+klng−i],
where parameter k ∈ [0,1/2] indexes the degree of spillovers.2 When k = 0, citizens
consume only the public good in their own district, while for k = 1/2 they equally
consume public goods in both districts. Postulating uniform k (across regions) means
that citizens from both districts consume both public goods in the same proportion.3
The range of preference types is l ∈ h0,lmaxi in each district. The respective me-
dian type in district i is denoted by mi. We assume, without loss of generality, that
the median citizen in district 1 is at least as pro-public spending as his counterpart in
district 2, i.e. m1 ≥ m2. We also assume that 2m1 < lmax. The latter condition will be
needed in Section 5 to obtain interior solutions.
Under a decentralized system, the level of public goods in each district is chosen
by the government of that district and public goods are ﬁnanced by a uniform head tax
on local residents. Thus, if district i chooses a public good level gi, each citizen in this
district pays a tax of pgi. Under a centralized system, the levels of public goods are
2 For more universal speciﬁcations of public goods preferences, see (Besley, Coate, 1999, 2000)).
3 It could be that citizens from district 1 cared equally about the public goods in both districts, whereas
citizens from district 2 cared only about their own public good. That is to say, proportional public goods
preferences k could differ among regions. Moreover, differences among citizens from the same district
could occur, i.e. a citizen could, for instance, derive beneﬁt from both public goods, but his neighbor from
the same district could be interested only in the public good provided by his own district. We will, however,
assume these spillovers to be of a purely technical nature. Moreover, we will assume them to be the same for
citizens from both districts as well as for the citizens in a given region, so as to be able to capture the fact that
the resolution between centralization and decentralization depends on the (symmetric) degree of spillovers
and the extent of heterogeneity in preferences for public goods.
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determined by a government that represents both regions. Spending is being ﬁnanced
by two possible tax systems, whose outcomes will be compared. The ﬁrst one is a
uniform head tax on all citizens; with public good levels g1,g2, this tax is p(g1+g2)/2.
The second one is a head tax which is non-uniform across districts, but uniform for all
citizens within a given region. A citizen of each region pays a head tax proportional to
his consumption of both public goods; thus, public goods levels g1,g2 and degree of
spillovers k result in a head tax of pgi(1−k)+ pg−ik in district i.
Our social welfare criterion for comparing the performance of centralized and de-
centralized provision of local public goods will be the aggregate public goods surplus.
With public goods levels (g1,g2), it is deﬁned as
S(g1,g2) = [m1(1−k)+m2k]lng1+[m2(1−k)+m1k]lng2− p(g1+g2).
The surplus is a median citizens’ sum of the marginal beneﬁts from their con-
sumption of public goods or, more precisely, a sum of the differences between median
citizens’ utilities under the system with public goods and the system without public
goods:
DUm1 +DUm2 = x1− pg1+m1[(1−k)lng1+klng2]−x1+
+x2− pg2+m2[(1−k)lng2+klng1]−x2 = S(g1,g2)









This result reveals that the surplus-maximizing public goods levels take account of
the beneﬁts received by citizens from both districts.
3. Classic Setup
The model outlined above allows a simple exposition of the traditional analysis
according to Oates (1972), who inﬂuenced many public ﬁnance economists’ views on
the relative merits of centralization and decentralization. He supposed that, in a de-
centralized system, each district’s government independently chooses the policy which
maximizes the public goods surplus in the region (which is DUmi, i ∈ {1,2}). A pair of
expenditure levels (gd
1,gd
2) will form a Nash equilibrium, which requires that:
gd
i = arg max
gi
{mi[(1−k)lngi+klngd
−i]− pgi}, i ∈ {1,2}.











4 The vector is an interior solution of a simple maximization of function S(g1,g2). We obtain it by taking
ﬁrst-order conditions, i.e. by differentiating this function w.r.t. g1 and g2 and setting it equal to zero. It is
straightforward to verify that the second-order conditions are satisﬁed and we leave this proof to the reader.
This remark applies to all of the subsequent maximization problems.
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Each region’s government thus only takes into account the beneﬁts received by its
constituency and local public goods are surplus-maximizing only when there are no
spillovers, regardless of heterogeneity in tastes. When spillovers occur, public goods
production results in under-provision in both districts and this under-provision is in-
creasing in the extent of spillovers.
Under a centralized system, Oates assumed that the government would be restricted
to provide a uniform level of public goods, denoted gc. He further assumed that expen-
ditures would be ﬁnanced by a uniform head tax, which is, in the case of uniform
provision of public goods, identical to our proposed non-uniform head tax that takes
intoaccount theproportional consumption ofboth goods bycitizensfromeach region.5
This common level of public goods satisﬁes






The uniform level of public goods is independent of the level of spillovers and results
in the surplus-maximizing level only in the case of identical districts.6 However, when
m1 > m2, centralization over-provides public goods to district 2 and under-provides
them to district 1 except when spillovers are maximal, i.e. k = 1/2. In this situation,
citizens consume public goods in both districts equally, which leads to uniform provi-
sion of public goods in both regions.
3.1 Comparative Statics
When regions are homogeneous, centralization produces surplus-maximizing pub-
lic goods levels and dominates decentralization whenever spillovers are present. Cen-
tralization has the conventional advantage of internalizing spillovers, as Figure 1 illus-
trates.
FIGURE 1 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd) and Cen-














5 This stems from the simple fact that, with uniform provision and identical prices of local public goods,
Oates’ head tax p(g+g)/2 = pg equals pg(1−k)+ pgk = pg.
6 Throughout the text, the phrases identical (non-identical) and homogeneous (heterogeneous) districts will
indicate that the median citizens from each region have (do not have) the same public goods preferences.
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In the case of heterogeneous districts, decentralization yields surplus-maximizing
public goods levels and dominates centralization when there are no spillovers. In con-
trast, when the spillovers are maximal, centralization produces surplus-maximizing
public goods levels and dominates decentralization. When the spillovers are in between
these two polar cases, there exists a critical level of spillovers above which centraliza-
tion dominates and under which decentralization is preferred; see Figure 2.
FIGURE 2 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd) and Cen-














Proposition 1. Suppose that the assumptions of the standard analysis are satisﬁed.
(i) If the regions are homogeneous and spillovers are present (k > 0), a centralized
system produces a higher level of surplus than does decentralization. In the ab-
sence of spillovers (k = 0), the two systems generate the same level of surplus.
(ii) If the districts are heterogeneous, there is a critical value of k, greater than
zero but less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of
surplus if and only if k exceeds this critical level.7
According to Oates, without spillovers, a decentralized system is preferred. With
spillovers and homogeneous districts, a centralized system is superior. With spillovers
and heterogeneous regions, it is necessary to compare the extent of the two effects.
It is often suggested that heterogeneity favors the case for decentralization. In our
model, this does not follow immediately, since we cannot conjecture that the critical
level of spillovers increases in heterogeneity.8 In any case, modeling the trade-off be-
tween centralization and decentralization in the classic setup relies on the assumption
of uniform expenditures under centralization, which is a too restrictive assumption;
henceforth we expand the model to include the possibility of non-uniform provision.
7The proof of this, as well as the other results, may be found in the appendix.
8This may be analyzed by letting Sd(k,a) and Sc
t (k,a) denote surpluses under decentralization and cen-
tralization, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (aw,(1−a)w), where a ∈ h1/2,1i measures the degree of het-
erogeneity between the two regions. Districts are identical when a = 1/2 and become more heterogeneous
when a increases. Then, Sc
t (k,a) = wln(w/2p)−w, which is independent of both k and a. Therefore
we can write Sc
t (k,a) = Sc
t . The critical value of k, denoted k∗(a), is uniquely deﬁned by the equation
Sd(k∗,a) = Sc
t . To show that k∗ is an increasing function of a, it is necessary to show that for all a,
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4. Political Economy with Two Forms of Taxation
4.1 Decentralization
In a decentralized system, we assume that each region elects a single representative
fromthatregiontochoosepolicy.Ourmodelisbasedonthecitizen-candidateapproach
to political decision-making, which has two stages. First, elections determine which
citizen from each district is selected to constitute the decision-making government in
that district (election stage). Second, policies are chosen simultaneously by the elected
representatives in each district (policy-selection stage).
Using backward induction,9 we proceed as follows. First, we ﬁnd what the elected
representatives select (stage 2 or the policy-selection stage) and then we discuss whom
citizens, considering outcomes which are subsequently selected by the representatives,
will appoint to an ofﬁce (stage 1 or the election stage). Beginning with stage 2, let
the types of the representatives in district 1 and 2 be l1 and l2, respectively.10 Then
the policy outcome (g1(l1),g2(l2)) satisﬁes
gi(li) = arg max
gi
{li[(1−k)lngi+klng−i(l−i)]− pgi}, i ∈ {1,2}.










the level of each district’s public goods spending is higher the stronger is the public
good preference of its representative and lower the higher is the level of spillovers.
Now let us move to stage 1. With the representatives l1 and l2 in region 1 and 2,











These preferences over types determine citizens’ voting decisions. A pair of repre-
sentative types (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred under decentralization if, in each dis-
trict i, a majority of citizens prefer the type of their representative to any other type
l ∈ h0,lmaxi, given the type of the other district’s representative l∗
−i.










The ﬁrst term is positive, while the second one is negative. As spillovers increase, the ﬁrst term goes to
zero. Thus, it is possible that ¶Sd(k,a)/¶a < 0. (In our speciﬁcation of public goods preferences, the sur-
plus under decentralization is always decreasing in heterogeneity for all k > 1/4. This ﬁnding makes it
possible that the critical level of spillovers is decreasing in heterogeneity, i.e. The case for centralization
could be strengthened as the regions become more diverse.)
9Backward induction is an iterative process for solving ﬁnite extensive-form games. First, one determines
the optimal strategy of the player who makes the last move of the game. Then, the optimal action of the next-
to-last moving player is determined taking the last player’s action as given. The process continues in this
way backwards in time until all players’ actions have been determined. Effectively, one determines the Nash
equilibrium of each subgame of the original game.
10We assume that candidates have no opportunity costs, i.e. any citizen can agree to be a candidate; and
that representatives can only decide on the provision of public goods, i.e. there are no other perquisites of
the ofﬁce.
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 1, no. 3 229Tuchyˇ na P, Gregor M: Centralization Tradeoff with Non-Uniform Taxation
We assume that the elected representatives in the two regions will be of these ma-
jority preferred types. Further we assume that each citizen votes sincerely (according
to his public goods preferences), does not abstain, and has perfect information.
Citizens’ preferences over types are single-peaked,11 implying that a pair of repre-
sentative types is majority preferred under decentralization if and only if it is a median
pair; i.e. (l∗
1,l∗
2) = (m1,m2). This yields:
Lemma 1. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are satis-










These levels of local public goods respect the preferences of the median citizen
within a region, which agrees with the standard local public ﬁnance analysis.
4.2 Centralization with Two Forms of Taxation
The policy determination process under centralization also has two steps: an elec-
tion stage; and a policy selection stage. In the elections, one citizen from each district
is chosen to serve in a common legislature. In the policy selection stage, the legisla-
ture determines public goods provision in each region. Our ﬁrst method of capturing
the decision-making process in the legislature will be the minimum winning coalition
view. Under this view, a coalition of just above 50% of the representatives forms to
share the beneﬁts of public spending among their districts. Regions whose representa-
tives are outside the coalition are only allocated spending to the extent that this beneﬁts
coalition members. The logic is that, in a majority rule legislature, if there were any
more than just above 50% of the representatives in the coalition supporting the spen-
ding bill, the majority of coalition members would beneﬁt from expelling the surplus
members and further concentrating spending on their own regions. Because there are
many possible minimum winning coalitions, this view suggests that there will be un-
certainty concerning the identity of the coalition that forms to determine expenditures.
In our model, we may capture this uncertainty by assuming that each representative
can be thought of as a minimum winning coalition with equal probability. Thus, again








2(li) is the optimal choice of district i’s representative.
4.2.1 Uniform Taxation
With uniform taxation and representatives of types l1 and l2, the optimal choice















11Given any two types ˆ li and l0
i such that l0
i < ˆ li < l or l < ˆ li < l0
i, type l citizens always prefer type ˆ li
citizens.
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, i ∈ {1,2}.
The level of public goods spending depends only on the decisive representative’s prefe-
rence for public goods and the level of spillovers. The stronger the preferences for pub-
lic goods of the decisive representative, the higher the spending. Furthermore, spending
for the representative’s domestic public good varies inversely with spillovers, while
the other district’s public good expenditures vary proportionally with spillovers.
When the representative types are l1 and l2, a citizen of type l in region i obtains



























Again we assume that the representatives will be of the majority preferred types. A pair
of representative types (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if in each district i
the median type prefers l∗
i to any other type l ∈ h0,lmaxi, given the other district’s
representative type l∗
−i.12 This means that (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if
it is a Nash equilibrium of the two-player game in which each player has strategy set































Thus, an elected pair of representatives will be of types (m1,m2) and will choose a po-
licy which reﬂects their public goods preferences. So we have:
Lemma 2. Suppose uniform taxation and centralization with a minimum winning
coalition view of the legislature. Then, (g1,g2) = (2m1(1−k)/p,2m1k/p) with pro-
bability 1/2 and (g1,g2) = (2m2k/p,2m2(1−k)/p) with probability 1/2.
This result illuminates the main drawbacks of centralization with a minimum win-
ning coalition legislature and uniform taxation:
12If citizens of type l prefer a type ˆ li candidate to a type l0
i candidate, where ˆ li < l0
i (ˆ li > l0
i), then so
must all citizens of types lower (higher) than l. This implies that a majority of citizens in district i prefer
a type ˆ li candidate to a type l0
i candidate if and only if the median type prefers a type ˆ li candidate to a type
l0
i candidate.
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1. Uncertainty. Each district faces uncertainty as to the amount of public good that
it will receive, reﬂecting the uncertainty in the identity of the minimum winning
coalition.
2. Misallocation. Public expenditures across regions are skewed towards those in-
side the winning coalition.
4.2.2 Comparative Statics
The only situation in which centralization produces the surplus-maximizing level
is when the districts are identical and spillovers are maximal (k =1/2). When districts
differ (m1 > m2) and spillovers are complete, spending is allocated equally across re-
gions but district 1’s representative over-provides local public goods, while district 2’s
representative under-provides them. While higher levels of spillovers still lead those in
the minimum winning coalition to allocate public goods to districts outside the coali-
tion, it is only to the extent that this beneﬁts those inside the coalition.
For low levels of spillovers, the misallocation problem is at its worse. Public goods
are over-provided to regions in the minimum winning coalition and under-provided to
those districts that are outside the coalition, reﬂecting the budgetary externality created
by common ﬁnancing. However, this drawback is signiﬁcantly suppressed as long as
the non-uniform tax system is introduced.
4.2.3 Non-Uniform Taxation
With non-uniform taxation and representatives of types l1 and l2, the optimal
choice of region i’s representative is
(gi
1(li),gi
2(li)) = arg max
(gi,g−i)
{li[(1−k)lngi+klng−i]−(pgi(1−k)+ pg−ik)}.











, i ∈ {1,2}.
As above, if the representative types are l1 and l2, a citizen of type l in district i























Analogously to the case of uniform taxation, we arrive at the conclusion that an
elected pair of representatives will be of types (m1,m2) and that they will choose a
policy which reﬂects their preferences. This establishes:
Lemma 3. Suppose non-uniform taxation and centralization with a minimum winning
coalition view of the legislature. Then (g1,g2) = (m1/p,m1/p) with probability 1/2
and (g1,g2) = (m2/p,m2/p) with probability 1/2.
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Compared to the case of uniform taxation, the problem of uncertainty remains
due to the unknown identity of the coalition. However, the drawback of misallocation
is signiﬁcantly reduced, reﬂecting the fact that each district is taxed according to its
proportional consumption of both local public goods. This suppresses the incentives of
the coalition members to allocate too much of the public goods to their districts while
forgetting about the regions outside the coalition.
4.2.4 Comparative Statics
The levels of public goods are independent of spillovers. They depend only on
the preferences of the decisive representative which then chooses uniform provision of
public goods. With identical representatives, centralization with non-uniform taxation
produces the surplus-maximizing levels of local public goods. When m1 exceeds m2
and spillovers are complete, region 1’s representative over-provides local public goods,
while district 2’s representative under-provides them.
The misallocation problem is at its worse when the spillovers are lower than com-
plete. The levels of public goods provided are further from the optimal, aggregate sur-
plus enhancing levels. However, the extent of these misallocations is lower than that
under the centralized system with uniform taxation.
4.3 Centralization versus Decentralization
4.3.1 Homogeneous Districts
Decentralization produces the surplus-maximizing public goods levels if and only
if spillovers do not occur. We have already seen that public goods levels under centrali-
zation with uniform taxation are surplus maximizing when the spillovers are complete
and the districts are homogeneous. It follows that, in the case of identical districts, de-
centralization dominates when the spillovers are small and centralization is preferred
when the spillovers are large.
Centralization with non-uniform taxation produces the surplus-maximizing public
goods levels when the districts are identical. This surplus is independent of spillovers
andishigherthanthesurplusunderdecentralizationforallk exceptwhenthespillovers
are absent. In such a case, both systems generate the surplus-maximizing public goods
levels. The next proposition and Figure 3 summarize these results.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are
satisﬁed, the centralized decision making relies on the minimum winning coalition,
and the districts are identical. Then:
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of k, strictly greater than 0 but
less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus
if and only if k exceeds this critical level.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts and spillovers are present (k >0),
a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus than does decentraliza-
tion. In the absence of spillovers (k = 0), the two systems generate the same
level of surplus.
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FIGURE 3 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd), Centrali-
zation in the Standard Analysis (Sc
t) and Centralization with Uniform (Sc
u)
and Non-Uniform (Sc
















(iii) The surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation equals that under
the centralized system in the standard analysis for all levels of spillovers. These
surpluses are higher than that under centralization with uniform taxation except
when the spillovers are maximal (k = 1/2). In such a case, all three systems of
centralization produce the same public goods surplus.
There are two comparisons which require analysis. First, comparing Proposition 2
with its counterpart in part (i) of Proposition 1, there is one signiﬁcant difference. With
identical districts, the centralized system in the standard analysis is supposed to domi-
nate decentralization for all k >0. However, centralization based on the minimum win-
ning coalition and uniform taxation no longer dominates for low levels of spillovers, as
those inside the coalition have low incentives to provide public goods to the outside re-
gions. This is further combined with the uncertain identity of the coalition. With higher
spillovers, uncertainty remains but the decisive representatives have higher incentives
to provide more public goods to both districts, which increases the surplus under cen-
tralization. Thus, political economy analysis weakens the case for centralization when
taxation is uniform.
Second, a comparison of the two centralized systems under the political economy
analysis generates a strong case for centralization with non-uniform taxation, which
dominates for all k < 1/2. This is due to the effects that each taxation has on the deci-
sions about the allocation of public expenditures. When the taxation is uniform, each
district pays the same head tax independent of the level of public goods received. This
motivates coalition members to allocate as much as they like to their districts. In con-
trast, under the centralized system with non-uniform taxation there is no such effect,
as each district is taxed according to its proportional consumption of both local public
goods. This balances the allocated levels and centralization with non-uniform taxation
signiﬁcantly dominates centralization with a uniform tax system. Furthermore, the re-
sulting surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is the same as under
centralization in the standard analysis.13
13This is due to the fact that the provision of public goods and the actual taxes under centralization with
non-uniform taxation are the same as under the centralized system in the standard analysis. With identical
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4.3.2 Heterogeneous Districts
When the regions are heterogeneous, a centralized system with uniform taxation
still dominates decentralization for high levels of spillovers and its performance is
increasing inspillovers.Thus,thereisacriticalvalueofk underwhich decentralization
is preferred and above which centralization dominates.
Centralization with non-uniform taxation is independent of spillovers, produces a
higher level of surplus than decentralization for maximal spillovers and a lower level
of surplus for zero spillovers. It follows that there exists a critical value of k above
which the centralized system dominates and under which decentralization is preferred.
However, this critical value is lower than that in the uniform taxation case. Again,
the following proposition and Figure 4 summarize these ﬁndings.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the assumptions of the political economy analysis are
satisﬁed, the centralized decision-making relies on the minimum winning coalition,
and the districts are non-identical. Then
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of k, strictly greater than 0 but
less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus
if and only if k exceeds this critical level. This critical level is higher than that
in the standard analysis.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts, there is a critical value of k,
strictly greater than 0 but less than 1/2, such that a centralized system pro-
duces a higher level of surplus if and only if k exceeds this critical level. This
critical level is higher than that in the standard analysis and lower than that
under centralization with uniform taxation.
(iii) The surplus under centralization in the standard analysis is higher than the sur-
pluses under both centralized systems in the political economy analysis for all
levels of spillovers. Furthermore, the surplus under centralization with non-
uniform taxation is higher than that under the centralized system with uniform
taxation except when the spillovers are maximal (k = 1/2). In such a case,
the two systems produce the same public goods surplus.
As above, two juxtapositions can be observed. First, comparing Proposition 3 with
its relevant counterpart in part (ii) of Proposition 1 reveals that centralization with a
non-cooperative legislature creates an even larger incongruity when the districts are
heterogeneous. This exacerbated misallocation problem combined with the persistent
drawback of uncertainty results in a weakened case for centralization compared with
the centralized system in the standard analysis. However, the fundamental qualitative
conclusions remain unchanged under the political economy analysis as under the tra-
ditional one: for low spillover levels, decentralization dominates; when the spillovers
are high, centralization is preferred.14
districts, each representative would choose such uniform public goods levels that would be chosen by all
the other representatives, if elected.
14What happens with both critical levels of spillovers as heterogeneity increases may be analyzed by let-
ting Sd(k,a),Sc
u(k,a) and Sc
n(k,a) denote surpluses under decentralization and under centralization with
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FIGURE 4 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd), Centrali-
zation in the Standard Analysis (Sc
t) and Centralization with Uniform (Sc
u)
and Non-Uniform (Sc

















Second, the comparison of the two centralized systems with different taxations
remains as above. This is because the two systems’ surpluses decrease at the same
rate with increasing heterogeneity.15 Thus, centralization with non-uniform taxation
dominatescentralizationwithauniformtaxsystemforallk <1/2.Whenspilloversare
complete, the two systems generate the same level of surplus. This reﬂects the fact that,
in the uniform taxation case, a representative in the winning coalition has incentives to
provide the same level of public goods to both regions, which corresponds to the case
of non-uniform taxation.
Furthermore, the surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is lower
thanthatundercentralizationinthestandardanalysis.Inthenon-uniformtaxationcase,
increasing heterogeneity causes the potential provisions of the two representatives to
vary still more. This decreases the surplus under centralization with non-uniform tax-
ation, and because the surplus under the centralized system in the traditional analysis
is independent of heterogeneity, centralization with a non-uniform tax system gener-
uniform and non-uniform taxation, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (aw,(1−a)w), where a ∈ h1/2,1i is
the degree of heterogeneity between the regions. The ﬁrst critical level of k, denoted k∗
1(a), is uniquely de-
ﬁned by the equation Sd(k∗
1,a) = Sc
u(k∗
1,a). To show that k∗
1 is an increasing function of a, it is necessary


































The expression in the latter parentheses equals zero when a = 1/2 and is positive for all a in the range
(1/2,1). Thus, the difference is positive for all a ∈ (1/2,1) and k∗
1 < 1/2, which implies that the critical








for all k and a, the critical level of spillovers increases with increasing heterogeneity for the non-uniform
taxation case as well.
15See the previous footnote.
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ates a lower public goods surplus.16 It follows that political economy analysis weakens
the case for centralization when the taxation is non-uniform but not as considerably as
in the case of a centralized system with uniform taxation.
5. Cooperative Centralization and Two Forms of Taxation
Under the minimum winning coalition view of legislative decision-making, policy
outcomes are ex ante Pareto inefﬁcient from the viewpoint of the representatives. Thus,
legislators may ﬁnd a way around the inefﬁciency created by majoritarian decision-
making criteria and prefer a less random outcome to the “feast or famine” implied by
the minimum winning coalition theory. The representatives with power may, to a given
extent, allocate beneﬁts to those outside the coalition on the understanding that non-
members would behave similarly if they were in power. However, there are many pairs
of local public goods levels that are efﬁcient from the viewpoint of the representatives
and that ex ante Pareto dominate the minimum winning coalition outcomes.
Here we will assume the case where the representatives agree to the public goods
allocation that maximizes their joint surplus, i.e. their behavior can be described by
the utilitarian bargaining solution. This means that each representative now maxi-
mizes the same utility function as the others. They agree to form a coalition where
everybody will have a weight in the decision-making process, not just those who suc-
ceed in forming a minimum winning coalition. This norm requires representatives to
take into account the costs and beneﬁts to their colleagues and would seem to offer
centralization the best chance of dominating decentralization given our welfare crite-
rion. But the extent to which centralization will dominate decentralization will again
depend on the form of taxation.
5.1 Uniform Taxation
With uniform taxation and representatives of types l1 and l2, the policy outcome



























It is clear that if both districts elected representatives of the median types, the legisla-
ture would select the surplus-maximizing public goods levels.
16Let Sc
t (k,a) and Sc
n(k,a) denote the surpluses under centralization in the standard analysis and with
non-uniform taxation, respectively, when (m1,m2) = (aw,(1−a)w), where a ∈ (1/2,1) measures the de-
gree of heterogeneity. From the previous discussion we know that Sc
t is independent of heterogeneity while
¶Sc
n(k,a)/¶a = w(1−2a)/2a(1−a) < 0 for all a ∈ (1/2,1). This implies that increasing heterogene-
ity decreases the surplus under centralization with a non-uniform tax system, which is then lower than that
under a centralized system in the traditional analysis.
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If the representative types are l1 and l2, a citizen of type l in district i obtains














Turning to the election stage, we again assume that the pair of representatives will be
of the majority preferred types deﬁned in the by now familiar way. The main additional
complication created by a cooperative legislature lies in ﬁnding the majority preferred
types. This is because the public goods level for each region depends on the type of
legislator in both districts and, thereby, generates incentives for citizens in each district
to delegate policy-making strategically to a representative with different tastes than
their own. This intention arises because sincere voting becomes suboptimal now.
To begin with, note that a pair of representative types (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority pre-
ferred if and only if in each district i the median type prefers l∗
i to any other type
l ∈h0,lmaxi, given the other district’s type l∗
−i.17 Thus, (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred
if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the two player game in which each player has














In this game, the district i median citizen tries to manipulate li so that he obtains
something close to his preferred policy outcome anticipating the election outcomes
in the other region and the subsequent working of the legislature.18 He only has one
degree of freedom, li, but two objectives, (g1,g2). While raising li always leads to an
increase in gi, if k > 0 it also raises g−i.




ˆ k3+(1− ˆ k)3
ˆ k(1− ˆ k)
.
When the districts are identical, ˆ k = 1/2. In the non-identical districts case, ˆ k < 1/2.
Then:




































17If district i elects a citizen of a higher type, then it receives more of both public goods. Then the same
argument applies as in footnote 17.
18To put it more rigorously, all citizens in region i now have an interest in manipulating li to obtain some-
thing close to their preferred policy outcome. In other words, all voters in district i have the same interest in
shifting li according to their preferences and expectations of the election outcomes in the other regions and
subsequent working of the legislature.
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It can be easily seen that the cooperative legislature does not select the surplus-
maximizing public goods levels. While a cooperative legislature deals with problems
of uncertainty and misallocation that were present in the non-cooperative legislature,
strategic delegation emerges: each district’s median voter delegates policy-making to
a representative of different than median type.
5.1.1 Comparative Statics
When the regions are identical (m1 = m2 = m), it follows from Lemma 4 that g1 =
g2 = g, and g = 2m[(1−k)2 +k2]/p. Recall that with identical districts, the surplus-
maximizing level of public goods is g1 = g2 = m/p. Thus, local public goods are over-
provided in both regions for all k < 1/2. the extent of this over-provision decreases
with increasing spillovers and over-provision does not occur only when the spillovers
are maximal (k = 1/2). In such a case, local public goods are provided optimally.
The incentives to strategically delegate can be seen most clearly in the case of zero
spillovers. Then, the optimal spending levels for the median voter from region 2 are
(g1,g2) = (0,2m/p). Assume for a moment that both districts elect median type re-
presentatives. This would lead to policy outcome (g1,g2) = (m/p,m/p). But if district
2 elected a representative with a stronger taste for public spending, it would get more
of its local public goods with no impact on district 1’s public goods level. Thus, each
region is drawn to elect a type 2m representative.
As spillovers increase, the optimal spending levels in the two districts for each me-
dian voter converge. Electing a representative with a higher preference for public goods
spending increases spending in the other region as well. Thus, the districts elect repre-
sentatives with preferences closer to their median. When the spillovers are maximal,
each region elects a median type representative and local public goods are provided at
the surplus-maximizing level.
With heterogeneity, an additional conﬂict over the level of public spending enters
the picture, which can be seen most clearly in the case of complete spillovers. If k =
1/2 and each region elects a representative of the median type, the public goods levels
are g1 = g2 = (m1 +m2)/2p. This common level is too low for district 1’s median
voter and too high for region 2’s. This gives district 1’s median voter an incentive
to have a higher representative type to boost public goods spending, while region 2’s
median voter desires a representative with lower public goods preferences. They pull
in opposite directions until one or both districts has put in their most extreme type.
Our assumption that 2m1 < lmax implies that district 1 can obtain its preferred public
goods level when district 2 has put in its most extreme type. Thus, district 1’s median
voter ends up getting his preferred outcome of g1 = g2 = m1/p.
Thisadditionalconﬂictofinterestcreatesacomplexrelationshipbetweenspillovers
and public goods levels. Analyzing the solutions described in the Lemma, it can be
shown that district 1’s public goods level is decreasing in the level of spillovers for suf-
ﬁciently small k and k > ˆ k.19 However, it is increasing in spillovers for k sufﬁciently
close to but less than ˆ k. This reﬂects the conﬂict over spending levels that arises as
spillovers increase. To prevent district 2 from pulling down spending in both districts,
district 1’s median voter elects a representative with a higher public goods valuation,
raising district 1’s public goods level. Region 2’s public goods level is decreasing in
19This and the other claims concerning the public goods levels in Lemma 4 have been established in Besley
and Coate (1999, 2000). Here we add analysis of non-uniform taxation.
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spillovers for k < ˆ k and increasing thereafter. It increases for spillover levels in excess
of ˆ k, because it is now effectively controlled by district 1’s median voter.
Comparing these outcomes with the surplus-maximizing levels of public goods,
district 1’s public goods level is always too high. The level provided to region 2 is too
high for small k and when k is sufﬁciently large. However, it is less than the surplus-
maximizing level for k sufﬁciently close to ˆ k. Note that this under-provision is in
contrast to the over-provision results for the case of identical districts.
Itisclearatthispointthat,althoughthelegislaturefollowstheutilitarianbargaining
solution, the problem of strategic delegation causes that this solution may still be far
from the surplus-maximizing ideal. By introducing non-uniform taxation as deﬁned
above, we will nevertheless show that this problem is signiﬁcantly suppressed.
5.2 Non-Uniform Taxation
If the taxation is non-uniform and the representatives are of types l1 and l2, the po-





















Thus, as applicable also in the uniform taxation case, if both regions elected represen-
tatives of the median types, the legislature would select the surplus-maximizing levels
of public goods.













As was the case in the previous section, the main complication lies in ﬁnding the ma-
jority preferred types when sincere voting is suboptimal. This complication is again
due to the fact that the public goods level in each district depends on the type of le-
gislator in both regions and, thereby, generates incentives for citizens in each region
to strategically delegate policy-making to a representative with different public goods
preferences than their own.
A pair of representative types (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred if and only if in each
district i the median type prefers l∗




2) is majority preferred if and only if it is a Nash
20If district i elects a citizen of a higher (more public-good loving) type, then it receives more of both public
goods. Then the same argument applies as in footnote 17.
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equilibrium of the two player game in which each player has strategy set h0,lmaxi and











In this game, the district i median citizen tries to manipulate li so that he obtains
something close to his preferred policy outcome anticipating the election outcomes in
the other region and the subsequent working of the legislature. While raising li always
leads to an increase in gi, if k > 0 it also raises g−i.
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ˆ k(1− ˆ k)
.
When the districts are identical, ˆ k = 1/2. In the non-identical districts case, ˆ k < 1/2.
Then we have:




































It is easily seen that the cooperative legislature does not always select the surplus-
maximizing public good levels. However, although strategic delegation occurs also
when the taxation is non-uniform, it is signiﬁcantly suppressed compared to the uni-
form taxation case in a way we will now explain.
5.2.1 Comparative Statics
Withidenticaldistricts(m1 =m2 =m),theLemmaimpliesthat(g1,g2)=(m/p,m/p),
which are the surplus maximizing public goods levels. Thus, strategic delegation is
completely eliminated when the taxation is non-uniform and the districts are homoge-
neous. This is because neither district is drawn to elect a representative with a stronger
taste for public goods, as each region knows that it will have to pay proportionally to its
consumption. If it elected a higher type representative, the resulting increase in the pro-
vision of local public goods would be fully ﬁnanced by the given district, which is in
contrast to the uniform-taxation case, where both districts participate in this increase
in ﬁnancing by only a half. Therefore, each district elects a median type representative
and the local public goods are provided optimally, regardless of the level of spillovers.
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Heterogeneity again gives rise to strategic delegation, but to a lesser extent com-
pared to the uniform taxation case. The only situation in which strategic delegation
with non-uniform taxation is as strong as in the case of uniform taxation occurs when
the spillovers are maximal. If k = 1/2 and each district elects a median type repre-
sentative, the policy outcome is g1 = g2 = (m1+m2)/2p. But this level is too low for
region 1’s median voter and too high for that of region 2.21 This gives district 1’s me-
dian voter an incentive to elect a higher type representative and region 2’s median voter
an incentive to have a lower representative type. So they pull in opposite directions un-
til one or both districts has put in their most extreme type. Under our assumption that
2m1 < lmax, region 1 can obtain its preferred public goods levels when district 2 has
put in its most extreme type.
The relationship between public goods levels and spillovers is again very complex.
District 1’s public goods level is increasing in the level of spillovers for k < ˆ k.22 This
appears puzzling, as district 1’s median voter’s preferred public goods level is actually
constant in spillovers. The result reﬂects the conﬂict over spending levels. To prevent
district 2 from pulling down spending in both regions, district 1’s median voter elects a
representative with a higher taste for public spending, raising region 1’s public goods
level. Furthermore, district 1’s public goods level is decreasing for k sufﬁciently close
to 1/2. However, it can increase or decrease for k sufﬁciently close to but higher than
ˆ k. District 2’s public goods level is decreasing in the level of spillovers for k < ˆ k
and increasing thereafter. It increases for spillovers in excess of ˆ k because it is now
effectively controlled by region 1’s median voter.
Two comparisons require analysis here. Firstly, comparing these policy outcomes
with the surplus-maximizing levels, district 1’s public goods level is too high for all
levels of spillovers except when k = 0. In this case, region 1’s public good is provided
at the surplus-maximizing level. The level provided to district 2 is too low for all k <
ˆ k and for k higher than but sufﬁciently close to ˆ k. the only exception here is again
when k = 0. In this case district 2’s public goods level is the surplus-maximizing one.
Moreover, district 2’s public goods level is too high for k sufﬁciently close to 1/2.
Secondly, comparing public goods levels in the two tax systems, each district’s
public goods are provided at higher level when the taxation is uniform than under
the non-uniform tax system, except when spillovers are maximal. In such a case, both
systems generate the same public goods levels. Thus, non-uniform taxation suppresses,
though does not completely eliminate, the incentives to delegate policy-making strate-
gically to representatives with higher preferences for public spending.
5.3 Centralization versus Decentralization
5.3.1 Homogeneous Districts
We already know that decentralization produces the surplus-maximizing public
goods levels only in the case of zero spillovers. Public goods levels under centraliza-
tion with uniform taxation are surplus maximizing only when spillovers are complete
and the districts are identical. It follows that, in the case of identical regions, decen-
tralization dominates when spillovers are small and centralization is preferred when
21The optimal spending levels for district 1’s median voter are g1 = g2 = m1/p, whereas for region 2’s
median voter they are g1 = g2 = m2/p.
22This and the other claims concerning the public goods levels from Lemma 5 are established in the appen-
dix.
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spillovers are large. the surplus under centralization with uniform taxation increases
with increasing k and a critical value of spillovers exists above which centralization is
welfare superior.
When the districts are identical, centralization with non-uniform taxation produces
the surplus maximizing public goods levels for all spillover levels. This surplus is
higher than that under decentralization for all k except when the spillovers are ab-
sent. In such a case, both systems generate the surplus-maximizing public goods levels.
The next proposition and Figure 5 summarize these results.
Proposition 4. For cooperative legislature and identical districts:
(i) If the taxation is uniform, there is a critical value of k, strictly greater than 0 but
less than 1/2, such that a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus
if and only if k exceeds this critical level.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform across districts and spillovers are present (k >0),
a centralized system produces a higher level of surplus than does decentraliza-
tion. In the absence of spillovers (k = 0), the two systems generate the same
level of surplus.
(iii) Surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is higher than that un-
der centralization with uniform taxation except when the spillovers are maximal
(k = 1/2). In such a case, both systems produce the same public goods surplus.
FIGURE 5 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd), Centra-
lization with Uniform (Sc
u) and Non-Uniform (Sc
















There are two important ﬁndings which require analysis. First, when the taxation
is uniform, decentralization dominates when spillovers are low and centralization is
preferred when spillovers are high, whereas a critical level of spillovers exists and is
in the range (0,1/2). This is in line with the results obtained in the preceding sections
when the legislature was based on the minimum-winning coalition.
Second, this does not hold, however, when the taxation under centralization is non-
uniform. Such a system produces surplus-maximizing public goods levels regardless of
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the level of spillovers and dominates decentralization for all k > 0. Thus, non-uniform
taxation is a signiﬁcant tool for eliminating strategic delegation in the case of identical
regions.
5.3.2 Heterogeneous Districts
When the districts are heterogeneous, decentralization continues to dominate cen-
tralization with uniform taxation when spillovers are small and centralization is pre-
ferred when spillovers are large. The case of centralization with non-uniform taxation
is a bit more complicated when it comes to heterogeneous districts. Centralization still
dominates decentralization when spillovers are large, but it dominates decentralization
even when spillovers are small. Furthermore, it may be that centralization with non-
uniform taxation produces a higher public goods surplus than does decentralization for
all k > 0. However, there is no general presumption that this is always so. Decentrali-
zation may dominate centralization when k is sufﬁciently close to ˆ k.
These ﬁndings are summarized in the following proposition and Figures 6 and 7.
Proposition 5. For cooperative legislature and non-identical districts:
(i) If the taxation is uniform, a decentralized system produces a higher level of sur-
plus when spillovers are sufﬁciently small, while a centralized system produces
a higher level of surplus when spillovers are sufﬁciently large.
(ii) If the taxation is non-uniform, a centralized system produces a higher level of
surplus than does decentralization when spillovers are sufﬁciently large and
when spillovers are sufﬁciently small but positive. In the absence of spillovers,
the two systems generate the same public goods surplus.
(iii) Surplus under centralization with non-uniform taxation is higher than that under
centralization with a uniform tax system except when the spillovers are maximal
(k = 1/2). In this case, both systems produce the same public goods surplus.
FIGURE 6 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd), Centra-
lization with Uniform (Sc
u) and Non-Uniform (Sc
n) Taxation for Non-
Identical Districts and High Heterogeneity
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FIGURE 7 Aggregate Public Goods Surpluses under Decentralization (Sd), Centra-
lization with Uniform (Sc
u) and Non-Uniform (Sc
n) Taxation for Non-
Identical Districts and Low Heterogeneity













Three important lessons can be drawn from these statements. Firstly, the basic con-
clusions of part (i) of Proposition 3 generalize to the case of a cooperative legislature.
When the centralized system is ﬁnanced by uniform taxation, decentralization domi-
nates centralization for low spillover levels, while centralization dominates for high le-
vels of spillovers. The only difference here is that there need not exist a critical level of
spillovers at all. This reﬂects the fact that there is no general presumption that the rel-
ative performance of centralization is always increasing in spillovers. Surplus under
centralization is decreasing in k for k sufﬁciently close to but lower than ˆ k.
Secondly, the conclusions just mentioned do not carry over to centralization with
anon-uniformtaxsystem.Underthistaxation,thecentralizedsystemproducesahigher
surplus than does decentralization even for low levels of spillovers. This is due to
the nature of a non-uniform tax system, which means that the ﬁnancing of public goods
is not shared any more but is proportionally distributed between regions.
However, we cannot show that centralization always dominates decentralization
for all spillover levels. This reﬂects the fact that when the districts are sufﬁciently
heterogeneous, the decentralized system produces a higher surplus for k sufﬁciently
close to ˆ k, which is demonstrated in Figure 6.
On the other hand, when the regions do not differ very much in their public goods
preferences, centralization with non-uniform taxation dominates decentralization for
all k > 0 (Figure 7). Thus, although strategic delegation does arise under this system
as well, it does so to a much lesser extent compared to the uniform taxation case.
However, the policy outcomes produced under this system can still be improved in
the direction towards the surplus-maximizing ideal.
Finally, comparing the two tax systems, we must again conclude that centralization
with non-uniform taxation dominates centralization with a uniform tax system for all
k < 1/2. When the spillovers are maximal, the two systems produce the same pub-
lic goods surplus. This is in line with the results obtained for centralization based on
the minimum winning coalition.
We have thus generalized the conclusion that a non-uniform tax system produces
strictly better policy outcomes than does uniform taxation. In the case of a cooperative
legislature, centralization based on this taxation may even dominate decentralization
for all k > 0, which is a stunning result.
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6. Conclusions
This paper has taken a fresh look at the relative merits of centralized and decen-
tralized provision of local public goods, closely following Besley and Coate (2003). It
shows that allowing for non-uniform public goods and district-speciﬁc taxes means en-
hancing the performance of centralization relative to the case in which taxation and/or
provision is uniform across regions. Flexibility in cost shares has a very positive effect
on the performance of a centralized system in all of the studied cases. Speciﬁcally,
a centralized system with non-uniform taxation appears to weakly dominate centrali-
zation with a uniform tax system for all levels of spillovers except when the spillovers
are maximal. This result holds regardless of heterogeneity in tastes and the political
economy assumptions.
When decisions are made by a legislature of locally elected representatives, a non-
uniform tax system suppresses or completely eliminates the drawbacks created by
a centralized system with uniform ﬁnancing. If decisions on local public goods are
made by a minimum winning coalition of representatives, non-uniform taxation sig-
niﬁcantly reduces (when the regions are non-identical) or completely eliminates (in
the case of identical districts) the misallocation problem. Nevertheless, the uncertainty
remains due to the unknown identity of the coalition in either case. If decisions are
made on a more cooperative basis, then strategic delegation is signiﬁcantly suppressed
(when the districts are non-identical) or completely eliminated (in the case of identical
regions).
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proofs of Propositions 1, 2, and 3 are not very difﬁcult.
Therefore, we omit them due to space constraints and provide only Proofs 4 and 5 with
the associated Lemmas. However, they are available upon request from the authors.
Proof of Proposition 2. Available upon request.
Proof of Proposition 3. Available upon request.
Proof of Lemma 4. Due to the close similarity between the proof of this Lemma and
Lemma 5 and the fact that in this paper we focus more on the non-uniform tax system,
we refer to Besley and Coate (2003) for a thorough proof of this Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5. As mentioned in the text, (l∗
1,l∗
2) is majority preferred if and
only if (l∗
1,l∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the two player game in which each player has
strategy set h0,lmaxi and player i ∈ {1,2} has payoff function Ui(l1,l2). We prove
the Lemma by calculating the set of equilibria of this game and computing the associ-
ated policy outcomes.
Note ﬁrst that each player’s payoff function is a twice continuously differentiable
and strictly concave function of his strategy and each player’s strategy set is compact
and convex. Thus, the set of equilibria is non-empty. Moreover, ¶2U1/¶l1¶l2 <0 and
¶2U2/¶l2¶l1 < 0, implying that types are strategic substitutes.
Fori=1,2,letri :h0,lmaxi→h0,lmaxidenotetheregionimedianvoter’sreaction
function. By deﬁnition, for all l2 ∈ h0,lmaxi,
r1(l2) = arg max{U1(r1,l2) : r1 ∈ h0,lmaxi},
and for all l1 ∈ h0,lmaxi,
r2(l1) = arg max{U2(l1,r2) : r2 ∈ h0,lmaxi}.
Then, (l∗
1,l∗





Several general features of the reaction functions follow from the properties of
the payoff functions. The fact that each player’s payoff is a strictly concave and differ-
entiable function of his strategy implies (i) that r1(l2) = 0 if ¶U1(0,l2)/¶l1 < 0; (ii)
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that r1(l2) = lmax if ¶U1(lmax,l2)/¶l1 > 0; and (iii) that otherwise r1(l2) is impli-
citly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition ¶U1(r1(l2),l2)/¶l1 =0. In addition, the fact
that types are strategic substitutes implies that r1(l2) is non-increasing. Analogous
remarks apply to the district 2 median voter’s reaction function.
It remains therefore to determine the details of each player’s reaction function. Let
lmax
2 (lmax
1 ) denote the level of l2(l1) beyond which district 1’s median voter (district
2’s median voter) would like a type 0 representative. These levels are implicitly deﬁned
by the equalities
¶U1(0,lmax
2 )/¶l1 = 0,
and
¶U2(lmax
1 ,0)/¶l2 = 0.











































is decreasing in k, takes on the value 2 when
k = 1/2 and tends to inﬁnity as k goes to zero. This implies that lmax





2 ) denote the highest type representative that region 1’s (region 2’s)
median voter would want. These levels are implicitly deﬁned by the equalities
¶U1(l×
1 ,0)/¶l1 = 0
and
¶U2(0,l×
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Note that 1/(1−2k+2k2) is increasing in k, and takes on the value 1 when k =0 and
value 2 when k = 1/2. This implies that l×
1 ≤ 2m1 and l×
2 ≤ 2m2. By assumption,
2mi < lmax, so that the upper bound constraint on type choice is not binding here.
We may conclude from the above that for all l2 ∈ h0,min{lmax
2 ,lmax}i, r1(l2) is




and for all l2 ∈ (min{lmax
2 ,lmax},lmaxi,
r1(l2) = 0.
We also know that r1(0) = l×
1 and that r1(l2) falls on h0,min{lmax
2 ,lmax}i.
Analogously, for all l1 ∈ h0,min{lmax





and for all l1 ∈ (min{lmax
1 ,lmax},lmaxi,
r2(l1) = 0.
Also, note that r2(0) = l×
2 and that r2(l1) declines in h0,min{lmax
1 ,lmax}i.
We can now prove the lemma. If k < ˆ k, it follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ k in



















> 2m2 ≥ l×
2 .
These inequalities imply that there exists no boundary equilibria in which l∗
i = 0 for
one or more districts. If l∗
2 = 0, then l∗
1 = r1(0) = l×




1 ) > 0, which contradicts the fact that l∗
2 = 0. If l∗
1 = 0, then l∗
2 =
r2(0) = l×
2 , but since l×
2 < lmax
2 we know that r1(l×
2 ) > 0, which contradicts the fact
that l∗
1 = 0. Since maxri(l−i) < lmax, it is apparent that there can be no boundary
equilibria in which l∗




must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions ¶Ui(l∗
1,l∗
2)/¶li =0 for i∈{1,2}. Using the ex-








































































































1 ,0). This is because r2(l×
1 ) = 0 and r1(0) = l×
1 . the same arguments from above
imply that there exist no other boundary equilibria. We also claim that there are no
interior equilibria. Any such equilibrium (l∗
1,l∗
2) must satisfy the ﬁrst-order conditions
¶Ui(l∗
1,l∗


















But the assumption that k ≥ ˆ k implies that l∗
2 ≤ 0 if l∗
1 > 0, which, in turn, is in-
consistent with the hypothesis that (l∗
1,l∗
2) > (0,0). Thus, the only equilibrium is that














. The required policy










Proof of Proposition 4. When the regions are identical (m1 = m2 = m), the surplus
under centralization with cooperative legislature and










We establish six claims from which the proposition will follow.
CLAIM 1. Sc
u(0) < Sd(0) and Sc
u(1/2) > Sd(1/2).

















which holds. Computing the second inequality, we come to ln2 > 1/2, which is also
true.
CLAIM 2. Sc











> 0 for all k ∈ (0,1/2).
CLAIM 3. Sd(k) is decreasing in k.




n(k) is constant in spillovers.




This can be easily proven by inserting 1/2 into the functions of the surpluses.
Part (i) of the proposition follows from Claims 1, 2 and 3. Claims 3, 4 and 5 imply
part (ii) of the proposition. Finally, Claim 6, combined with Claims 2 and 5, implies
part (iii) of the proposition. 2
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Proof of Proposition 5. Considering non-identical districts (m1 >m2), denote the po-
licy outcomes under centralization with a cooperative legislature for uniform taxation
as (gc−u
1 (k),gc−u
2 (k)) and non-uniform taxation as (gc−n
1 (k),gc−n
2 (k)). Then the sur-
plus
















We prove the proposition via ﬁve claims.
CLAIM 1. Sc
u(0) < Sd(0).
Computing this inequality we come to the following one: ln2<1, which clearly holds.
CLAIM 2. Sc
u(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Let (m1,m2) be given. We can ﬁnd w > 0 and a ∈ (1/2,1) such that (m1,m2) =
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Thus, this difference is non-decreasing in a. So if Sc
u(1/2,1/2) > Sd(1/2,1/2), then
theinequalityholdsforalla intherelevantrange.Buta =1/2correspondstotheiden-
tical districts case and we already know that the surplus under centralization is higher
than that under decentralization then.
CLAIM 3. Sc
n(0) = Sd(0).








> 0 for all k ∈ (0,e), where e > 0.












This statement is easily checked. We leave this to the reader.
For the ﬁrst half of part (i) of Proposition 5, we employ Claim 1 and the fact that
both surplus functions are continuous functions of k. Then for each (m1,m2) there
exists d > 0 such that Sc
u(k) < Sd(k) for all k < d. A similar logic with Claim 2
establishes the second half of (i).
For part (ii), by utilizing Claims 5 and 2 we can prove that Sc
n(1/2) > Sd(1/2).
Since the surplus function for the non-uniform taxation case is a continuous function
of k, for each (m1,m2) we can ﬁnd d > 0 such that Sc
n(1/2−k) > Sd(1/2−k) for all
k < d. the latter half of (ii) is proven by employing Claims 3 and 4 and using the fact
that both surplus functions are continuous functions of k.
Part (iii) is algebraically tedious and is available upon request. 2
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